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Brandel: Business Associations

Business Associations
by Roland E. Brandel*
Because the law governing business associations is in large
part codified and subject to administrative regulation, this
article will emphasize new legislation and changes in policies
of agencies charged with the enforcement of that law. The
most sweeping changes were accomplished by regulations
issued by the commissioner of corporations, but there were
also several noteworthy amendments and additions to statutes
affecting corporations. Additionally, major changes to the
Corporate Securities Law are now before the legislaturel and
passage of a bill is expected during 1968. Neither space
nor time permits a definitive analysis of the multitude of recent
* B.S. 1960, Illinois Institute of
Technology; J.D. 1966, University of
Chicago Law School. Member, California State Bar. Practicing Attorney,
San Francisco.
The author extends his appreciation
to Michael Hunter, second year student
at Golden Gate College, School of Law,
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this article.
1. Assembly Bill 1 (1968) Reg. Sess.
Cal. Legis. (1968). Where topics under
discussion below can be related to the
proposed legislative revision, an attempt
has been made to do so.
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cases involving aspects of the law relating to business associations. Where a case has caused some change in the prior
law, however, an attempt has been made to signal that change
and to provide some appraisal of the rules of law it promulgates.

The Corporate Entity
As a general rule, a corporation is a distinct legal entity
that accumulates rights and incurs liabilities apart from the
natural persons, such as directors, officers and shareholders,
who are associated with it. The California courts, however,
liberally exercise a technique of piercing the corporate veil:!
to reach behind the separate nature of the corporate entity in
order to prevent injustice. The court of appeal did so in
Schoenberg v. Koutnik. 3 The decision held a husband and
wife liable under the alter ego theory for the debts of an
under-capitalized, but very successful, corporation of which
they were the sole shareholders. Because of the undercapitalization and the fact that corporate and personal finances
were inextricably intertwined, application of the equitable
doctrine that disregards the corporate entity was hardly surprising. 4
The alter ego theory was also applied, but with a less typical
result, in Ivy v. Plyler. 5 The defendant, Plyler, was an officer
and director of Lupine Oil Operations and operated that
corporation in such a manner that application of the doctrine
of alter ego was inevitable if an attempted interposition of
the liability shield ordinarily provided by the corporate entity
portended harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Plyler for amounts
due on certain contracts plaintiff had performed for Lupine
Oil. Plyler's response was to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, which he claimed barred suit on the debt. The court
held that Plyler was responsible for the corporate debts under
the alter ego theory and further that he was guilty of mis2. See generally 12 Cal. Jur.2d, Corporations § 8.
3. 251 Cal. App.2d 154, 59 Cal. Rptr.
359 (1967).
4

4. See Automotriz del Golfo de California v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306
P.2d 1, 63 AL.R.2d 1042 (1957).
5. 246 Cal. App.2d 678, 54 Cal. Rptr.
894 (1966).
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appropriation and defalcation when he withdrew corporate
funds for his personal use. Hence, plaintiff's debt was not
one dischargeable in bankruptcy under the provisions of section 17 ( a) ( 4) of the Bankruptcy Act. 6
Although the result reached is not unique, it would seem
that the route chosen is. The doctrine of alter ego "disregards
the corporate entity and holds the individual responsible for
acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the
corporation."7 The acts of the corporation in incurring the
debt, which were attributable to Plyler under this rule, were
not those that the Bankruptcy Act singles out as creating
nondischargeable debts. Further, Plyler's actions vis-a-vis
the corporation, in his fiduciary capacity, did not directly
create any debt owed plaintiff. The debt was clearly antecedent to Plyler's breach of fiduciary duty and was created
by corporate acts attributable to Plyler by application of the
alter ego theory. It can be argued that Plyler's misconduct,
if any, occurred in his relationship to the corporation and
its property and would create a right of recovery by the
corporate entity or one standing in the shoes of the corporation. Most cases involving corporations arising under
17 (a) (4) in fact involve recovery by the corporation itself8
or by a party, such as a receiver,9 trustee10 or surety,!1 who

=

6. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1964).
7. 246 Cal. App.2d at 682, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 897.
8. See Citizens Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Gardner, 315 Mich. 689, 24 N.W.
2d 410 (1946); Airo Supply Co. v. Page,
2 Ill. App.2d 264, 119 N.E.2d 400
(1954).
9. See In re DeGraaf, 22 F.2d 163
(S.D. Mich. [1927]); Harper v. Rankin,
141 F. 626, 72 C.C.A. 320 (4th Cir.
[1905]); McNeill v. Savin, 244 Wis. 552,
13 N.W.2d 82 (1944).
10. See In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703
(2d Cir. [1938]); Kaufman v. Lederfine,
49 F.Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. [1943]); Floyd
v. Layton, 172 N.C. 64, 89 S.E. 998
(1916); Bannon v. Knauss, 57 Ohio App.
288, 13 N.E.2d 733 (1937).
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11. See National Surety Co. v. Wittich, 185 Minn. 321, 240 N.W. 888
(1932); National Surety Co. v. Lanza,
42 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1943). These
cases allowed the surety to stand in the
corporate creditor's shoes through subrogation (see Johnson v. Mortgage
Guar. Co., 117 Cal. App. at 421, 4
P.2d at 210 [1931]), but not all suretyship cases can be thus explained. A
second line of suretyship cases can be
explained under statutory language, as
in the cases arising under the New York
Stock Corporation Law, because the act
of misappropriation itself created the
debt to the surety and hence would be
a transaction falling within the literal
terms of the Bankruptcy Act. See
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
CAL LAW 1967
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stands in place of the corporation. Several New York cases
have allowed recovery by creditors of a corporate entity
against an officer or director. They are atypical, however,
and can be explained by the specific provisions of section
15 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, which made
the very act of misappropriation or defalcation an act that
created a debt owed to the creditors. 12 Such a debt therefore
falls precisely within the words of the statute as one "created
by [the bankrupt's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation,
or defalcation while acting as an officer. . . "13
Allowing a claim of a creditor of a corporation to survive
the bankruptcy of an officer because of section 17 (a) ( 4) is
not without precedent, although none of the precedents involved application of the alter ego doctrine. 14 The decision
raises doubt, however, whether its rule is correct in light
of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act; whether defendant's
activity was serious misconduct of the type intended to be
covered by section 17 (a) ( 4 ) ;15 and whether the recovery
should properly have been corporate and therefore for the
benefit of all creditors.
As to the alter ego doctrine per se, defendant argued in
Ivy that if he and the corporation were to be treated as
one, then he committed no wrong by treating corporate property as his own. Following that argument briefly, one could
say that it is not atypical to find that sole proprietorships
are incorporated with no contemporaneous change in organization or practices and that the alter ego doctrine properly
disregards the corporate existence to protect third parties.
It would seem, however, that placing the third party in the
position where he has access to all of defendant's personal
assets would be sufficient to compensate for defendant's only
Flanagan, 28 F.Supp. at 419 (S.D. Ohio
[1939]).
12. In re Bernard, 87 F.2d at 707
(2d Cir. [1937]); In re Adelson, 187
Misc. 691, 65 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. ct.
1946).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a)(4) (1964).
6

14. In re Metz, 6 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.
[1925]); Banks v. Coming Bank & Trust
Co., 188 Ark. 841, 68 S.W.2d 452
(1934); Tatum v. Leigh, 136 Ga. 791,
72 S.E. 236 (1911).
15. See Cowan, BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE, §§ 472, 479 (1963).
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real wrong, which was the creation of an illusion of a separate
corporate entity where none existed.
If Ivy is now good law, one fact is crystal-clear. Incorporation of a small business may not only fail to provide the
protection from liability anticipated by creation of the separate entity; it may also cause individuals, in the event their
corporate and individual financial affairs fail, to lose the
ordinary protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Act. Adopting the corporate form as a form only, while intermingling
corporate and personal finances as if the business were still a
sole proprietorship, may cause an exposure to risk of unlimited personal liability.
Another case, which denied to a state agency, the State
Board of Medical Examiners, the ability to pierce the corporate veil seems to be a retrenchment from the liberal use of the
technique evidenced by Ivy. Sections 654 and 4080.5 of the
Business and Professions Code operate to deny physicians
and surgeons licensed to practice in California the right to
own or operate pharmacies. These provisions per se and
their applicability under particular circumstances were attacked on many grounds, including unconstitutionality, by a
host of medical practitioners who, under several different business forms, either operated or desired to operate pharmacies. The court of appeal in Magan Medical Clinic v.
State Board of Medical Examiners 16 engaged in an extensive
analysis of the social evil at which the legislation was directed.
Since shady practices might result when a conflict of interest
exists between the welfare of patients and economic participation of doctors in lucrative prescription-filling businesses,
the court held that the legislation, designed to forestall such
a conflict of interest, was constitutional. In response to the
argument that the literal language of the legislation prohibited only individuals from having an ownership interest, the
court in construing the intent of the statute said:
16. 249 Cal. App.2d 124, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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It is obvious that the statute would be completely frustrated if all that was necessary to circumvent the statute
was for two doctors to form a partnership, and then
operate a pharmacy where neither could
. operate
as such individually.17

Such a rationale would seem equally applicable to the
case of one or more doctors who use the corporate form to
circumvent the prohibition of these statutes. The court did
not foreclose that alternative, however, but ruled instead that
doctors may own pharmacies through the simple expedient
of using the corporate business form.ls The court deemed
itself compelled to interpret the statutes strictly because "the
statutes here involve penalties or forfeitures.
"19 The
court may also have had some reservations about the constitutionality of a rule that would deprive all doctors of the
right to participate in even minor shareholding of such enterprises as large chain drugstores. If the latter were the persuasive factor, either on constitutional or general policy grounds,
it might be ventured that a preferable result would be to allow
the corporate form to be ignored in those situations where
the corporation is merely the alter ego of a small group of
physicians or where doctors have clear control over management or disbursement of profits. Those situations must necessarily be within the scope of the statute if the statute is to
be effective, but the court might have compromised by stating
that corporate ownership per se is not a violation of the
statute. 20
17. 249 Cal. App.2d at 136, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 264.
18. The court reached the same conclusion in a companion case in interpreting the statutory provision (Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 4080.5) that prohibited the future licensing of doctors
to operate pharmacies. Warrack Med.
Center Hosp. v. State Bd. of Pharm.,
249 Cal. App.2d 118, 57 Cal. Rptr. 85
(1967). In Warrack, however, a clear
alternative ground for the decision also
existed.
19. 249 Cal. App.2d at 138, 57 Cal.
8

Rptr. at 266. It should be noted here
that the legislation was passed in 1963,
but did not require physicians who had
a prohibited interest in a pharmacy to
divest their interest until July 1, 1967.
The action here, then, was one for
declaratory relief, not for relief from
any immediate sanction.
20. Compare the provisions of Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 25502, which imposes more carefully drawn restrictions
on ownership of liquor sales outlets.
The court found the explicitness of that
statute an indication that the instant
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Another aspect of the corporation as an entity is its existence as a creature of the state. Thus, the state may utilize
sanctions, such as suspending or terminating the very existence of the corporation, which are not applicable to natural
persons. The California Supreme Court last year mitigated
the potentially harsh effects of a suspension of a corporation's
powers for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes pursuant
to Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301. In The
Traub Company v. Coffee Break Service, Inc./ the court made
clear that since the issue of incapacity of a corporation to
sue or defend a suit because of section 23301 was one only
of abatement, the section should be strictly construed against
the one asserting the incapacity. The specific issue in Traub
was cross-defendant's contention that a judgment in favor of
cross-complainant Coffee Break Service, Inc. could be collaterally attacked because of incapacity based on such a suspension. 2 The court disapproved language in Belle Vista v.
Hassen,3 which allowed such a collateral attack, and held that
the judgment could not be vacated on such a ground unless
the essential facts appeared in the judgment roll. The opinion
distinguished those cases where the corporate entity no longer
existed. 4
The court seems to have correctly decided that the legislature did not intend Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301
to operate as a forfeiture of substantive rights by virtue of
an inability to defend suits. The "penalty" incurred by such
a forfeiture would be totally unrelated to the seriousness of the
offense except by coincidence. Rather, the court seems to
view the statute's purpose as providing an impetus to rectify
tax delinquencies by denying access to the state courts so
long as the suspension is in effect.
statute was meant to have a more
limited scope. See also Schoenberg v.
Koutnik, 251 Cal. App.2d at 167, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 367 (1967).
1. 66 Cal.2d 368, 57 Cal. Rptr. 846,
425 P.2d 790 (1967).
2. See Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. at
298, 300, 295 P. at 39 (1930). Both
the reasoning of Traub and Reed v.
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Norman, 48 Cal.2d at 343-344, 309
P.2d at 812 (1957) weaken the continuing validity of Smith.
3. 227 Cal. App.2d 837, 39 Cal. Rptr.
184 (1964).
4. See cases cited in The Traub Co.
v. Coffee Break Serv., Inc., 66 Cal.2d
at 371, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848, 425 P.2d
at 792.
CAL LAW 1967
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A similar sensitivity to the harshness of a forfeiture of
substantive rights was apparent in the opinion in Old Fashion
Farms v. Hamrick. 5 Plaintiff, Old Fashion Farms, brought
an action for declaratory relief and specific performance of
an oral agreement to enter into a written lease and option to
purchase real property. Plaintiff had come under the suspension of Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 after the
pleadings, but prior to commencement of the trial. When the
defendant raised the issue of incapacity, plaintiff moved for
a thirty-day continuance to seek reinstatement. The court
denied the motion and was upheld by the court of appeal.
One could argue that a suspended corporation has no existence
and hence even entertainment of a motion for a continuance
is improper. The court held, however, that hearing such a
motion and granting a continuance were in the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion should be exercised in
the light of the substantive issues at stake in the proceedings.
The court upheld the denial of the motion for a continuance,
but only after stating that "our independent examination of
the contract
shows
that it could not be
specifically enforced in any event,"6 and that plaintiff had
failed to make any effort to revive its good standing in the
four months prior to the making of its motion.
Relationships Affected by the Corporate Entity
Transactions between a corporation and its directors are
closely scrutinized by the courts and are subject to the general
rule that the burden of proving the reasonableness or fairness
of such transactions is on the fiduciary.7 On the other hand,
transactions between a director or officer and a third party
are presumed not only to be within the scope of authority,
5. 253 Cal. App.2d 273, 61 Cal. Rptr.
254 (1967).
6. Given the demonstrated desire of
the California courts to resolve substantive rights on substantive grounds, it
would be interesting to speculate on
whether the harsher rule now apparently applicable to foreign corporations
will endure. See Cal. Rev. & Tax.
10

Code § 23301; Alhambra-Shumway
Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine
Corp., 155 Cal. App.2d at 50-51, 317
P.2d at 652 (1957).
7. See, e.g., Tevis v. Beigel, 156 Cal.
App.2d at 15, 319 P.2d at 102-103
(1957); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 109 Cal. App.2d at 420,
241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952).
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but also to be in good faith. Therefore, the burden of proof
is on the party challenging such transactions. s The court of
appeal, in Thompson v. Price,9 seems to have blurred
this distinction. In that case, plaintiff, in part, sought to
recover salaries and fees paid out by the corporation to defendant directors A and B, and a secretary. Neither the
secretary nor B performed services of value for the corporation. The trial court found that plaintiffs had not proved
the unfairness and unreasonableness of the salaries and fees
sought to be recovered, except for a small portion. The court
of appeal, in holding that the burden of proof had been improperly placed, stated that since A was a director, an officer
(general manager) and the attorney for the corporation, he
owed a fiduciary duty that required him to prove the drawings
he "manipulated" were fair and reasonable, including the dispersal of funds to the secretary.
It is clear that the court was correct in concluding that since
A and B were directors contracting with the corporation,
under the general rule they must assume the burden of proving
the reasonableness of the salaries paid to themselves by the
corporation. But the salary paid to A's secretary presents a
different situation. Here, from the facts given in the case,
the secretary appeared to be a third party with whom the
corporation contracted through defendant A. Although she
was also employed by A in his individual capacity, no evidence of personal benefit for director A was introduced. Yet
A was required to prove the fairness and reasonableness of
the salary paid to the secretary. The application to this latter
transaction of the general rule that requires a fiduciary in his
dealings with the corporation to prove fairness and reasonableness appears to be an extension of that rule. Although
the entire handling of the corporate affairs by defendant A appears to have been replete with fraud, the court's mere charac8. See Childress v. Dinkelspiel Co.,
Inc., 203 Cal. at 263, 263 P. at 802
(1928); Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 136
Cal. App.2d at 559, 288 P.2d at 962
(1955); Koshaba v. Koshaba, 56 Cal.
App.2d at 313, 132 P.2d at 861 (1942);
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Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg.
Corp., 96 Cal. App. at 557, 274 P. at
600 (1929); 3 Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPS., § 921 (1965).
9. 251 Cal. App.2d 182, 59 Cal. Rptr.
174 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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terization of the particular drawing as one "manipulated" by
defendant A, rather than made in the course of business, seems
insufficient to shift the burden of proof. It is submitted that,
absent proof of self-serving interests in the particular transaction, the rule requiring plaintiff to prove misdealing best
adjusts the balance between the need for easy recourse against
corporate fiduciaries and the continued need for flexibility and
freedom of corporate fiduciaries to meet business demands.
The courts also made progress in further defining the scope
of remedies available against corporate fiduciaries. Generally, a showing of actual injury and an award of compensatory damages is required in order to justify a recovery of
punitive damages.lO Authority exists, however, for the additional proposition that the requirements of the rule are met
where it is shown that a tort entitling the plaintiff to compensatory damages was clearly proven, but no actual award of
compensatory damages was made. l1 This latter rule was
applied in the corporate area in Topanga Corporation v.
Gentile,12 where punitive damages against a promoter who
had fraudulently acquired a substantial interest in plaintiff
corporation were allowed. Defendane 3 and others were promoters of plaintiff corporation which had been formed for
the purpose of purchasing a parcel of land. Each investor's
contribution purchased a proportionate stock interest in the
corporation and was to be used to pay for the property to
be purchased. Defendant conducted the negotiations for the
purchase of the property and indicated to the other promoters that the purchase price was $210,000. As part of
the down payment to finance the purchase, defendant agreed
10. See Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal.
at 282-83, 4 P.2d at ISO-lSI, 9 P.2d
at 506, 81 A.L.R. at 910-911 (1931);
Kluge v. O'Gara, 227 Cal. App.2d at
209, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (1964); Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App.2d at 736-37,
48 P.2d at 712 (1935); Chavez v. TimesMirror Co., 72 Cal. App. at 697, 237
P. at 1086-87 (1925); Prosser, TORTS
13 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal.2d
12
CAL LAW 1967
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at 163-64, 217 P.2d at 21 (1950); Clark
v. McClurg, 215 Cal. at 284-85, 4 P.2d
at 151-152,9 P.2d at 506-07, 81 A.L.R.
at 911-912 (1931); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App.2d at 400-03,
221 P.2d at 970-71 (1950).
12. 249 Cal. App.2d 681, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1967).
13. A husband and wife were codefendants in Topanga but they will be
referred to in the singular.
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to cOIltribute a ranch, which he falsely represented as being
worth $70,000, for a one-third interest in the corporation.
The ranch was in fact worth only $10,000. The court of
appeal affirmed the trial court's cancellation of the entire
original issue of stock and order to reissue stock in proportion
to the promoters' actual investment, but reversed its determination that no authority existed to grant punitive damages.
In holding that plaintiff was entitled to a determination
of the issue of punitive damages on its merits, the court stated
that "the fact that plaintiffs were not given a grant of monetary damages of a certain amount is not determinative."14
The court concluded that plaintiff was indeed damaged by
defendant's fraud, since he had not received stock commensurate in value to his contribution to the corporation. The
disregard of the strict rule, requiring an actual award of
compensatory damages as a prerequisite to punitive damages,
appears to make particularly good sense in Topanga because
the relief awarded was clearly in effect an order requiring
defendants to give up a property interest to plaintiffs that
could have been translated into monetary terms.
The state legislature dealt with a director's duty of
care by amending section 829/ 5 which specifies those sources
of financial information upon which a director may rely
without fear of incurring subsequent liability for negligent
violation of section 824. The latter section prohibits authorization by directors of certain transactions between a corporation and its shareholders except as provided for by statute.
The amendment ratifies common business practices by making
it clear that a director may rely on financial statements
certified by certified public accountants, as well as those of
public accountants.
The courts also resolved a previously unsettled issue in the
relationship of shareholders inter sese. In almost all states,
the notion that the proportionate share of capital investment
of shareholders is the significant criterion for determining the
14.249 Cal. App.2d at 691, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 719.
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15. All statutory citations are to the
California Corporations Code, unless
otherwise indicated.
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right of control through voting has replaced the notion of one
man, one vote, that existed at early common law. However,
the question of the precision with which proportional representation should equate with investment, that is, whether
fractional voting should be permissible, rarely has been faced
by the judiciary.16 Some states provide expressly by statute
for the right to vote fractional shares;17 others, such as California, imply that fractional shares may be voted, by permitting disenfranchisement of fractional shares in the articles or
bylaws of a corporation. IS A widely cited Pennsylvania case,19
on which much secondary authority is based, held that absent
a legislative provision authorizing the voting of fractional
shares, such voting is prohibited.
Garnier v. Garnier20 decided the related but more unusual
point whether an owner of a whole share may split that share
into fractional votes. 1 Four of the nine shareholders of
Garnier Enterprises, Inc. voted such a fractional vote in an
election of directors, the result of which was a victory for
their three candidates by one-third of a vote. The losers
brought an action to determine the validity of the election
and both the trial and appellate courts held that "only whole
votes may be cast by persons holding only whole shares,
absent some contrary provision in the articles or bylaws.,,2
Commentators have indicated that fractional shares per se
present problems3 and fractional voting assumedly would
merely add to those problems. The argument in favor of fractional voting is that a stockholder's voting rights should be
coextensive with his pecuniary interest in the corporation.
Such an argument, however, does not carryover to split
voting of whole shares. Even though such voting has oc16. See Ann. 98 A.L.R.2d 361 (1964).
17. See, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.126
(1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.19 (1957).
18. Cal. Corp. Code § 2215.
19. Commonwealth ex reI. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40
A.2d 30, 155 A.L.R. 1088 (1944).
20. 248 Cal. App.2d 255, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1967).
14
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1. The Cartwright case also presented
the issue whether the vote of a whole
share may be split, but the court did
not directly decide that issue.
2. 248 Cal. App.2d at 259, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 250.
3. See Sobieski, Fractional Shares in
Stock Dividends and Splits, 16 Bus. Law
204, 205 (1960).
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curred in California before, 4 it seems that no persuasive policy
reason exists to warrant splitting whole votes and that Garnier
therefore presents the proper resolution of the issue. Hence,
in California today, voting of fractional shares is permissible
unless the corporation expressly forbids it, and splitting of
whole votes is not permissible unless the corporation expressly
allows it.
Voting, though, is only one method of ownership control
of corporate transactions. A more direct method is that of
a suit brought by a shareholder against a party who has
wronged the corporation. Section 834 sets forth required conditions precedent before an individual may bring such a derivative action on behalf of a corporation or an unincorporated
association. The section's function is to provide some measure of protection from strike suits, 5 which are derivative
actions brought to achieve some covert personal gain for the
litigator. One feature of the section has been to grant some
measure of protection from the adverse effects of spurious
litigation by allowing the corporation or a defendant director
or officer to move that the court require the plaintiff to furnish
security in an amount fixed by the court to cover "reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by
the moving party and the corporation in connection with such
action, including expenses for which said corporation may
become liable pursuant to Section 830."6 If the court determines that security should be furnished, the action is dismissed unless it is furnished within a reasonable time.
Without the security provision, corporations might be coerced by such suits into paying a settlement to a plaintiff by
4. See Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal
Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35 P. 1045, 37 P.
207 (1894); Edward Sidebotham & Son,
Inc. v Chandler, 183 Cal. App.2d 823,
7 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1960).
5. See Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42
Cal. 2d at 23, 265 P.2d at 8 (1954);
Ballantine, Abuse oj Shareholders Private Suits: How Far is California's New
"Security jor Expenses" Act Sound Reg-
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ulation, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 399 (1949);
Comment, 1 V.C.L.A. L. Rev. 79, 8081 (1953).

6. Cal. Corp. Code § 830 allows corporations to indemnify directors, officers, or employees for expenses incurred
in the defense of suits arising out of a
position in, or activities undertaken on
behalf of, the corporation under specified conditions.
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virtue of a suit's mere existence rather than its merits,7 since
the alternative might be lengthy and costly litigation. On the
other hand, the security requirement could be an offensive
weapon in the hands of a wrongdoing corporation, officer or
director. Where a plaintiff has meager economic resources
behind a meritorious, good-faith attempt to correct an abuse
of corporate power, the security requirement might provide
a technique for nipping in the bud any controversy over
improper corporate activities. 8 The technique of making a
motion for security might also provide a costly delaying tactic
that could have the collateral effect of forcing a legitimate
suitor out of the courts, even if the motion proves unsuccessful.
The legislature has now amended section 834 to provide
a maximum for the security amount that can be fixed by the
court. The order fixing the nature and initial amount of the
security may not exceed $25,000, and the total amount resulting from discretionary increases allowed by the statute as the
action progresses may never exceed $25,000.
The amendment also provides a technique whereby the
plaintiff can eliminate the hearing on a motion for security,
with its attendant delay and cost. In response to an allegation
by a moving party that the situation is such that security
should be required by the court, the plaintiff may choose
to post a bond in the maximum amount prior to the holding
of the hearing on the motion, and thereby obviate the necessity for such a hearing. Unless the plaintiff chooses to post
a bond in the maximum amount of security, the nature of the
security is at the discretion of the court, and other assets of
the plaintiff may be accepted. 9
Even given these plaintiff-oriented amendments, however,
it is unlikely that persons who bring spurious litigation, but
lack some independent wealth, are apt to receive succor from
the limit on security. Once a court has found that "there
is no reasonable possibility that the .
action .
7. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan, 337
U.S. 541, 548, 93 L.ed. 1528, 1537, 69
S.Ct. 1221, 1226 (1949); Comment, 3
Stan. L. Rev. 151, 153-54 (1950).
8. See Hornstein, New Aspects oj
16

Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Col.
L. Rev. 1, 2-7, 31-32 (1947).
9. Cal. Corp. Code § 834(b)(2);
Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Ca1.2d
at 26-27, 265 P.2d at 10-11 (1954).
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will benefit the corporation or its security holders,,,lo it is
unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to find a surety willing
to advance the necessary funds.
Those persons initiating derivative suits did not similarly
benefit from judicial change during 1967 in the law of section
834. If a security amount was repressive,11 plaintiffs in the
past had sought and received appellate review of the security
order. 12 In a carefully reasoned decision in Woodman v.
Ackerman,13 the first district (Ellington, J.) held that such
an order is not appealable. The court reasoned that either
the order setting security or the judgment of dismissal, if the
security is not posted, is appealable, but not both. Since the
trial court may alter its order setting security prior to the
judgment of dismissal, and since the judgment of dismissal is
without prejudice, the court held that hearing the issue only
in the form of an appeal from the judgment of dismissal
would best further the interests of justice. The decision has
particular validity now that a maximum security amount has
been legislatively imposed on the security. Although it results
in a restraint from interposition of appellate review until
the trial court has made its final determination in the matter,
the likelihood of imposition of a repressive security is now
reduced and the derivative suitor is subject to no worse
penalty than a delay in the final resolution of his allegations.
One other change in shareholder power that should be
noted is that the requirements for shareholder approval of
agreements for merger or consolidation of corporations have
been altered by amendments to sections 2239, 4107, 4110
and 4111 of the Corporations Code, which accord with recommendations made by the State Bar Committee on Corpo10. Cal. Corp. Code § 834(b)(1).
11. The amount set in Woodman v.
Ackerman, 249 Cal. App.2d 644, 57
Cal. Rptr. 687 (1967), for instance, was
$245,000 or almost ten times the
amount allowable under amended
§ 834. If this sum represents an accurate estimate of costs, one may argue
that the legislative ceiling gives little
2
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real security to defendants and operates
only to discourage the faint-hearted
strike suitor.
12. See Marble v. Latchford Glass
Co., 205 Cal. App.2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr.
789 (1962).
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 644, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 687 (1967).
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rations. 14 The effect of the amendments to the four sections
is to allow shareholders to approve mergers or consolidations
without a formal meeting. Written consent must be unanimous, however, rather than merely by two-thirds approval.

Corporate Securities: Legislation and Case Development
Several important amendments to the Corporations Code
revised the law affecting securities regulation. The most significant change was the addition of a provision that allows
curative permits to be issued by the corporations commissioner
to alleviate the consequences of an improper security issuance. 15 Under prior law, in cases where no permit had been
issued prior to the sale of a security or where a security
had been sold in non-conformity with a provision of a permit
that had been issued, Corporations Code section 26100 had
rendered the security void. The courts had already mitigated
the most extreme consequences of the literal statutory language of section 26100 by refusing to allow a party who was
the issuer or in pari delicto with the issuer to have the issue
declared void. 16 Therefore, a security issued without a permit has been viewed as voidable, at the discretion of an
innocent shareholder. 17
This judicial development left unresolved problems, however. Unlike many jurisdictions, California's securities law
14. Comm'r of Corp., Report of the
Comm'r, 41 Cal. St. B.I. 795 (1966).
15. Cal. Corp. Code § 25518.
16. See Domestic & Foreign Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d at
558-61, 51 P.2d at 77-79 (1935);
Western Oil & Ref. Co. v. Vena go Oil
Corp., 218 Cal. at 743-45, 24 P.2d at
975-76, 88 A.L.R. at 1278-80 (1933);
Eberhard v. Pacific Southwest Loan &
Mortgage Corp., 215 Cal. 226, 9 P.2d
302 (1932); Maner v. Mydland, 250
Cal. App.2d at 529, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
742-44 (1967).
17. See Haakh, The Amorphous Concept "Void" of Corporations Code Sec18
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tion 26100, 29 L.A.B. Bull. 292, 293
(1954); Note, Noncomplying Securities
in California: Iudicial Protection of
Interests under Corporations Code
§ 26100, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1184 (1966).
The innocent shareholder may not always be protected, however; see Reed
v. Norman, 41 Ca1.2d 17,256 P.2d 930
(1953). The legislature itself experimented with a "voidable" rule in the
1930's, which rule included a provision
for a curative permit. The rule was
short-lived, however, being in effect only
from 1931 to 1933. See Dahlquist,
Regulation and Civil Liability under
the California Corporate Securities Act:
III, 34 Cal. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1946).
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contains no express statute of limitations. Is Unknowing and
good-faith violations of the permit requirements presented
grave problems of business uncertainty and operated, often
unfairly, to give a purchaser an extended option on participation in the success of the business whose securities he had
purchased. I9 Again, in those cases where only a technical
violation of a permit had occurred, some effort had been made
at mitigating these effects, this time through administrative
practice. The practice involved the issuance of a new permit
and a reissuance of stock in consideration of the claims against
the issuer possessed by holders of the void securities. 20 Although the new permit had been described as a curative
permit,! it was not retroactive 2 to the date of issuance. Nor
was it possible to completely effectuate such a new issue
without the voluntary permission of all of the security holders,
some of whom might choose to be recalcitrant and play a
waiting game with odds heavily stacked in their favor. 3
Under the new statutory provision, an issuer may apply for
relief to the division; if the commissioner finds that under
the circumstances it would be "fair, just and equitable [to
issue a curative permit] and that the applicant is transacting
and intends to transact its business fairly and honestly," he
may obviate the effect of section 26100 by issuing a curative
permit. 4 Such a permit is effective retroactively as of the
date the securities concerned were first issued and sold, thereby validating the original issue. 5 Further, when application
for a curative permit has been made and a prima facie case
18. Dahlquist, 34 Cal. L. Rev. at 70119.
19. Dahlquist, 34 Cal. L. Rev. at 708;
Note, 18 Stan. L. Rev., at 1190. Consider, for instance, the potential for
unfairness presented by the arguable
ability of franchise holders to avoid
their obligations under the Commissioner's decision (discussed infra) to
treat many franchise agreements as
securities.
20. Corporation Commissioner, Curative Permits, 43 Cal. St. B.I. 103, 104
(1968).

1. See Wheat, Issuance of Securities
under the California Securities Law, in
C.E.B., ADVISING CALIFORNIA BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES

497, 552-553 (1958).

2. Non-retroactivity might leave some
problems unsolved; such as, for instance, the questionable effectiveness of
corporate acts requiring shareholder approval taken prior to the new issue.
See Note, 18 Stan. L. Rev. at 1190.
3. See Wheat, C.E.B. 497, 552-553.
4. Cal. Corp. Code § 25518.

5. Cal. Corp. Code

§

25519.
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for granting a curative permit has been shown, the applicant
has the right to have stayed any trial "which turns on the
provisions of section 26100" until the commissioner makes
a decision on the application. 6 This provision would therefore
allow an issuer surprised by an allegation that his securities
were void to rectify the matter even at the last minute.
Curative permits are apt to provide needed protection for
all parties in transactions where securities law violations
have taken place, despite good-faith attempts to comply with
the law. Persons having interests in the enterprise, but no
relationship with the guilty party, will not be inadvertently
penalized, and yet the amendments will allow action to be
taken against parties who have engaged in faulty conduct.
This result will obtain because the issuance of a curative
permit renders inapplicable only the voiding provisions of section 26100; the curative permit "shall have no effect on the
criminal liability of any person nor upon any cause of action
other than that based on the provisions of Section 26100.'"
The legislature also added language to section 251 OQ, which
sets forth securities that are exempt from the provisions of the
Corporate Securities Law. Subsection (a) of section 25100,
which sets forth exemptions for securities issued by governmental agencies, was amended by adding to the categories
of governmental agencies exempted any "public district or
authority, or other public agency, public entity, or public
corporation therein."8
Subsection (k) of section 25100, which exempts securities
issued under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, was also amended
by adding the words "or plan of arrangement" to the provision for exemption of securities "issued under or pursuant to
6. Cal. Corp. Code § 25521.
7. Cal. Corp. Code § 25520.
8. This exemption does not ordinarily
apply to transactions of brokers
(§ 25101).
Because § 25602 requires
the submission to the commissioner of
"advertisements" (see § 25600) for the
sale of securities for possible disapproval (§§ 25602,25603), brokers would
be required to submit advertising re20

lated to otherwise exempt public body
securities absent a specific exemption in
§ 25602.
In order to retain a congruity between exemptions affecting
public agency securities, securities which
are free themselves from regulation by
the commissioner of corporations,
§ 25602 was also amended to render its
exemption provision for such securities
identical with that of § 25100(a).
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a plan of reorganization.
" The legislature declared,
however, that neither the amendment to subsection 25100(a)
or subsection 25100(k) should be construed as making any
substantive change in the existing law. 9
An addition to the exemption provisions that did work a
change in the existing law is contained in paragraph 2 of
new subsection (0) of section 25100. That subsection deals
with life income contracts issued by "a company organized
exclusively for educational, benevolent, fraternal,
charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for pecuniary
profit.
." to persons who donate property to the organization. The contract is essentially an annuity for either the
donor or a person designated by the donor. Paragraph 1
of subsection (0) specifically exempts all such contracts that
were issued prior to the amendment. Here again, the legislature stated that this exemption provision was only declarative of existing law. 10
Future contracts in this category will not automatically
be exempt from the provisions of the Corporate Securities
Law, however. An organization desiring to issue such contracts without a permit must now seek an exemption for the
organization by order of the commissioner. He is empowered
to allow such an exemption for the particular issuer rather
than the particular security, if he finds
that such company is of such size or has such investment experience or capability that the protection of the
public otherwise provided by the issuance of a permit
is not required, and that the exemption of such agree9. Cal. Stats., ch. 1411, § 3 (1967).
Whether the additional language of
§ 25100(a) in fact only reflects the previous law is not a question beyond dispute. Although no judicial opinion
was located that held otherwise, the
Attorney General suggested in an opinion on Sept. 8, 1966 (before recalling
it on Oct. 7, 1966) that the exemption
did not apply to "securities of state
authorities, agencies, districts, or similar bodies without taxing powers . . . ."

48 Op. Att'y Gen. 90, 92 (1966). This
opinion, which reached the same result
as to the scope of the exemptions of
§ 25602, was in large part based on the
specific statutory enumeration of exempt bodies followed by a general exemption for a "taxing district." The
amendments to both § 25100(a) and
§ 25602 deleted the phrase "taxing district."
10. Cal. Stats. ch. 1411, § 3 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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ments, contracts or other arrangements offered or issued
by such company is in the public interest. l l
Some degree of control is now exercised over such arrangements, therefore, where previously none existed.
The legislature took a rather firm position with respect to
another type of organization that may well be both educational and nonprofit in nature, a company organized for the
"promotion, development or operation of a world's fair.,,12
New section 25102.5 of the Corporations Code not only removes a general exemption for securities of such an issuer,
it eliminates the availability of statutory provisions of general
application that would ordinarily exempt the types of securities enumerated from the provisions of the Corporate Securities Law. A world's fair company is now denied exemptions
available to other issuers for certain securities of nonprofit
organizations, which include commercial paper issued in the
ordinary course of legitimate business, and promissory notes
that are issued in a private offering. 13
The Court of Appeal for the Second District judicially
defined the scope of section 25100 (I) during the past year.
That section exempts from the provisions of the Corporate
Securities Law "any partnership interest in a general partnership, or in a limited partnership where certificates are executed, filed, and recorded as provided by sections 15502 and
15525 . . . , except partnership interests when offered to
the public."
In Solomont v. Polk Development CO.,14 plaintiffs sought,
among other things, rescission of a partnership agreement
allegedly based on fraud and, based on the void security
provisions of section 26100, recovery of amounts paid by
11. Cal. Corp. Code § 25100(0)(2).
The fee for obtaining an order for such
an exempt status is $50.00 (Cal. Corp.
Code § 26018).
12. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 3, 1966, at 8. If experience
is any teacher, one may profit vicariously from the New York World's Fair
venture and conclude that some of such
22
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organizations not only are nonprofit,
but that they present a considerable investment risk for those who purchase
their securities.
13. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25102(a),
(b) and (c).
14. 245 Cal. App.2d 488, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 22 (1966).
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them into the partnership. The partnership at issue had been
formed by defendant company and other individuals who
had been solicited by an agent of defendant. The purpose
of the partnership was to construct and operate a fifty-unit
apartment building. Partnership interests were sold to plaintiffs in a transaction wherein misrepresentations were made
as to the total cost of the building. After completion of the
building and its operation for three years, the partnership
became insolvent and plaintiffs brought the action to recover
their investment. The judgment, as affirmed by the court of
appeal, allowed plaintiffs to recover the amount of their contributions less receipts from operation of the apartment building that had been turned over to them. The opinion contains
several threads of analysis, only some of which bear on
whether a permit to issue the partnership interests should have
been obtained.
The court's holding that a permit was necessary was based
on three factors. First, the court held that failure of defendant to comply with the specific provisions of section 15502,
which sets forth the filing requirements for a certificate of
limited partnership, foreclosed the business transaction from
being a valid partnership. Next, the court held that the misrepresentation in the formation of the partnership rendered
it one induced by fraud and it was, therefore, void ab initio.
Finally, citing Rivlin v. Levine/ 5 the court held that the
business formed could not have been a partnership within
the meaning of section 25100 ( 1) because the partners were
individually solicited and therefore "did not have the right of
mutual selection of all their copartners.,,16
The court reached the correct result in the case, but it
seems that some of its language in discussing the above three
factors may create an unnecessary ambiguity in partnership
law and the scope of the securities law exemption for partnership interests. With regard to whether a party is deprived of
the exemption of 25100 ( 1) because of a failure to fully
comply with the provisions of sections 15502 and 15525, it
15. 195 Cal. App.2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr.
587 (1961).
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Rptr. at 25.
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is submitted that the preferable analysis is contained in Farnsworth v. Nevada-Cal Management, Ltd. 17 That case examined the purposes of the Corporate Securities Law exemption
for partnerships and stated "that any abortive attempt to
form such an organization [limited partnership] results in a
general partnership and
[t]hus all types of partnerships are exempt from application of the Corporate Securities Law provided the interests therein are not offered to the
public.,,18 The court in Solomont based its conclusion on
the disparate purposes of the statutes involved. Both the
securities law and the limited partnership law operate to
protect the public, but the purpose of the former is to protect
the public from insubstantial investment schemes. So far
as part of its purpose is public protection, the Limited Partnership Act protects the public dealing with partnerships from
an unpublicized assertion of limited liability by members of
the partnership19 and is effective without invoking the securities law. The court did not discuss the Farnsworth analysis.
Insofar as the implication of Solomont is that failure to comply
with the filing provisions under the act results in retroactive
automatic activation of legal rules designed to regulate transactions among investors inter sese, the court's analysis appears
to be potentially troublesome.
The second concept, that a fraud in the formation of the
partnership renders the partnership void ab initio for purposes
of the securities law, has little support in California law.
The unreported case, Miller v. Kraus,20 cited as an authority
in Solomont, did not involve a securities law question. It
announced and expanded upon a theory of voidness ab initio,
but the order of the California Supreme Court denying a
rehearing 20a cast considerable doubt on the validity of the anal17. 188 Cal. App.2d 382, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1961).
18. 188 Cal. App.2d at 386, 10 Cal.
Rptr. at 533. The language in Farnsworth was over broad in labelling the
resulting business form a general partnership for all purposes, for aside from
the soundness of the Farnsworth analysis vis-a-vis the securities law, the gen24
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eral rule under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act is to the contrary. See
United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d at
461-62, n. 13 (9th Cir. [1961]).
19. See 2 Rowley, PARTNERSIDP 562
(2d ed. 1960).
20. 155 P. 834 (Cal. App. 1915).
20a. Miller v. Krause, 155 P. 838
(1916).
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ysis. A general rule of voidability of the partnership by the
particular person defrauded is well recognized, but it controls
only the rights between the immediate parties. The rule, for
instance, does not affect a defrauded partner's rights vis-a.-vis
liability to third parties, nor does it affect the rights of partners who were not defrauded inter sese.! The remedy for
the defrauded partner is rescission and restitution under either
the concept of recovery based on a theory of failure to obtain
the necessary permits, a violation of the Corporate Securities
Law that brings into play section 26100, or under the concept
of a recovery based on a fraudulent creation of the partnership. It would seem unnecessary, therefore, to speak of the
entire partnership entity as void and to invoke the Corporate
Securities Law in order to reach the proper result.
Admittedly such a rule produces a poetic justice of sorts.
The securities law is designed to protect the public from fraud
in those transactions it covers and the court's rule would automatically bring some typically exempt transactions within the
scope of the law if fraud were involved. But there is an
"overkill" potential in reaching the result through section
26100, in the possible exposure of persons to criminal sanctions where none were intended. 2 Further, the effect of such
a rule on other members of the voided partnership, who may
have engaged in no fraud in the transaction, is not clear.
The third line of analysis, that of the mutual selection requirement, was considered separately from the two preceding
analyses. 3 The holding that an essential element of a true
limited partnership is the mutual selection of all members
of the limited partnership is based on a California case, the
holding of which was primarily based on a leading article
§ 85
751-53

securities, the current securities law
provides exemptions from all its provisions.

2. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 26103,
26104. Unlike the proposed Corporate
Securities Law (Assembly Bill 1, 1968
Reg. Sess. Calif. Legis. [1968]), under
which the civil and criminal liability
provisions are applicable even to ~xempt

3. "Wholly apart from the mutual
selection test of Rivlin, . • • the
entity was not an exemption within
the meaning of section 25100. . . ."
245 Cal. App.2d at 495, 54 Cal. Rptr.

1. See Crane,
(1952); 1 Rowley,
(2d ed. 1960).

PARTNERSHIP,
PARTNERSHIP,

llt 26"
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dealing with corporate securities. 4 As the author of that
article points out, however, the governing statute indicates
that a right of mutual selection is not a sine qua non of a valid
limited partnership, for the business relationship may be constructed so as to limit that right and, instead, to allow substitution of limited partners without the consent of other partners.5 It has been noted that a limited partner has little
interest in the selection of other partners because of his relative lack of participation in management or control. 6 The
reason for the mutual selection rule, therefore, thus does not
seem to dispose persuasively of the existence or nonexistence
of a limited partnership.7
It cannot be denied that the right of mutual selection is a
force persuasive of the lack of need for regulation under the
securities law,S but it does not seem that exercise of that right
4. Dahlquist, Regulation and 'civil
Liability under the California Corporate
Securities Act, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 343,
363 (1945).
5. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 15018,
15502(a)X, XI, 15519(4). Absent an
agreement to the contrary, permitted by
these statutory provisions, the rule is
clear that "no person can become a
member of a partnership without the
consent of all the partners." Cal. Corp.
Code § 15018(g).
In deciding whether a partnership
interest was within the scope of the
Illinois and federal security laws, an
Illinois court recently said:
"The general rule that new members
of a partnership . . . must be known
to and approved by the existing members of the group is subject to the
agreement on which the relationship is
based. [citation] In the instant case,
it was clear from the communications
between [the initiator and an investing
partner] that the members of the group
were not specifically identified for the
plaintiff and the size of the group was
not fixed at the time the plaintiff joined.
We take it that the plaintiff joined with
this knowledge, which in effect became
26
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a part of the informal agreement on
which the venture was based." Polikoff
v. Levy, 55 Ill. App.2d at 336, 204
N.E.2d at 810 (1965).
Dahlquist, supra n. 4 cited the requirements for the signatures of all
members on amendments to the partnership certificate (Cal. Corp. Code
§ 15525), apparently to substantiate his
discussion of the requirement for unanimous approval, but such approval was
not necessary then, as he pointed out.
Not even the signatures are required
now in some cases (Cal. Corp. Code
§ 15525.5), even in those situations
where approval of all partners is necessary.
6. See 2 Rowley, PARTNERSHIP 549
(2d ed. 1960); Crane, PARTNERSHIP 34
(2d ed. 1952).
7. Compare the rules responsive to
the actual business relationship between
"partners" developed for the special
business form called a "mining partnership." Skillman v. Lachman, 23 Cal. at
206, (1863); Pub. Res. Code, §§ 23512361.
8. See Dahlquist, 33 Cal. L. Rev. at
361-67.
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should be essential to the existence of a valid limited partnership. Such a criterion might better be applied as a factor in
determining whether the offering of the limited partnership
interests was private or public. 9
The Attorney General issued an unpublished opinion during
1967 interpreting the scope of another exemption of the
Corporate Securities Law, that covering "a beneficial inter,,10
The opinion
est issued by a retirement system.
analyzes whether a stock bonus plan as part of a retirement
system is permissible when it contains certain withdrawal
provisions. The provisions under consideration allowed withdrawal of both the employee and employer contributions on
termination of employment, but only as much of the latter
as had "vested"; withdrawal at any time of the employee
contribution only, with suspension from participation for one
year as a consequence; and withdrawal of either the employee
or employer contribution in time of personal need, as determined by an administrative committee, with no penalty.
The Attorney General had previously held that other plans
containing withdrawal provisions did not qualify for the
exemption. The plan here under scrutiny by the Attorney
General, unlike previous plans submitted to the Attorney
General for opinion, contained more stringent deterrents to
withdrawal. The employee, for instance, could ordinarily
withdraw all of his stock only by quitting his job; withdrawal
of portions of his contributions would cause him to be suspended from participation in the plan for a year; and a third
permissible type of withdrawal could occur only under limited
circumstances. The Attorney General stated, therefore, that
such contributions of stock to a retirement system, where the
primary purpose was to provide benefits on retirement, was
permissible and within the scope of the exemption. Although
the withdrawal privileges provided collateral benefits, the lim9. In this regard see the discussion
of factors used by the Commissioner
in such an evaluation, infra, particularly those of (1) "the relationship of
the offerees to each other," and (2) "the

relationship between the issuer and the
offerees."
10. Cal. Corp. Code § 28006; 49 Op.
Att'y Gen. 144 (June 28, 1967).
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itations on those privileges rendered them consistent with the
primary purpose.
Lastly, the legislature provided additional protection to the
security-buying public by tightening the requirements for
brokers. California's Corporate Securities Law has long had
a provision for bonding as a prerequisite for favorable action
on an application for a brokerage certificate. A surety may
cancel the broker's bond, however, provided that he gives
thirty days' written notice to the commissioner. In order to
protect the public from a broker who might have a broker's
certificate and yet may no longer have a bond, language
has been added to section 25703 that makes failure to file
a replacement bond prior to termination of the old bond
sufficient reason for suspension or revocation of the broker's
certificate. It further provides that in those cases where a
new bond has not been filed prior to the issuance of the
notice of a hearing for suspension or revocation of the certificate, such hearing may be in an abbreviated form.ll
Corporate Securities: Commissioner Action
Perhaps as important as formal statutory amendments are
the regulations and other guidelines, in the form of bulletins,
that are issued by the commissioner of corporations in accordance with the authority vested in him by Corporations Code
section 25308. Several of the changes made administratively
in the past year affected areas long recognized as needing
change. The rules are steps in the direction of goals currently sought through legislative amendment of the securities
law, and may well be precursors of such legislative change.
The most significant change was the introduction of a new
"legend condition" to be used when permits are applied for
by corporations seeking to engage in an initial and private
11. Although the hearing need not
comply with the full provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act under
these circumstances, its procedure is
nevertheless subject to minimum principles of due process. Abrams v Daugherty, 60 Cal. App. at 299-304, 212 P.
at 943-45 (1922); see Endler v. Schutz28

bank, 68 Cal.2d - , 65 Cal. Rptr. 297,
436 P.2d 297 (1968); Drummey v. State
Bd. of Funeral Dirs., 13 Cal.2d at 80,
87 P.2d at 851 (1939); Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. at 250, 187 P. at 966
(1920); Angelopulos v. Bottorff, 76 Cal.
App. at 625-28, 245 P. at 448-50 (1926).

CAL LAW 1967

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/3

26

Brandel:Business
Business Associations
Associations

offering of their securities. 12 The new technique substitutes
a legend condition where the commissioner would previously
have imposed an escrow condition. 13 The legend condition
requires imprinting on the security a legend prohibiting transfer of the security, without the consent of the commissioner,14
except to specified transferees. The commissioner stated,
"The legend condition, by eliminating the requirement of an
escrow holder, will eliminate the expense to companies, attorneys and the Commissioner incident to the maintenance of an
escrow holder
[and] in most cases would serve
equally to protect the public against secondary transfers."15
The commissioner encourages applicants to use shortened
form applications, devised by the commissioner, for a permit
with a legend condition if the proper criteria are met. To
meet the criteria the applicant must be a California corporation which has no securities outstanding, and which does not
12. The original versions of the provisions applicable to the new legend
condition were promulgated by Commissioner of Corporations Bulletins
Nos. 67-3, 67-4 and 67-7. After minor
revisions, they were promulgated in
final form, to be effective November 22,
1967, as Title 10, California Administrative Code, sections 320.6, 407.2,
407.3 and 419. These implementing
regulations are expected to have a
broad impact, since it is estimated that
they will affect between ten and eleven
thousand applications annually, or as
much as 60 percent of the original issue
applications handled by the commissioner.
13. A proposed amendment to the
Corporations Code will exempt security
issues of the type covered by these rules
from the necessity of seeking any permit, provided that a prescribed legend
is imprinted on the face of the security.
Assembly Bill 1, 1968 Reg. Sess. Calif.
Legis. § 25102(h) (1968).
14. The legend currently prescribed
reads as follows: "IT IS UNLAWFUL TO
CONsUMMATE A SALE OR TRANSFER OF

THIS SECURITY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN, OR TO RECEIVE ANY CONSIDERATION
THEREFOR, WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF CORPORATIONS OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, NAMING BOTH TRANSFEROR
AND TRANSFEREE, EXCEPT THAT TRANSFERS MAY BE EFFECTED WITHOUT SUCH
CONSENT TO THE TRANSFEROR'S PARENTS,
CHILDREN,
GRANDCHILDREN,
SPOUSE,
AND CUSTODIANS OR TRUSTEES FOR THEIR
ACCOUNT, OR TO HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
OF THE SAME CLASS OF THE ISSUER OF
THIS SECURITY, ON CONDITION THAT ANY
CERTIFICATE EVIDENCING THIS SECURITY
ISSUED TO SUCH TRANSFEREE SHALL CONTAIN THIS LEGEND CONDITION."
Because the content of the legend
changed twice in the seven months between its initial and latest promulgation,
counsel must insure that the legend imprinted on any given security is the
precise legend authorized by the permit.
If use of the current legend is desired
in cases where the permit authorizes an
older form, an amendment to the permit must be obtained.

15. Commissioner
Bull. 67-3, at 1.

of
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propose to use any prospectus or advertisement or to pay
any commission or compensation for the sale of its securities.
It must also be one "whose securities are to be sold to not
more than five issuees,16 each of whom is either an officer or
director of the issuer, or related to an officer or director as
a parent, child, grandchild, spouse, and custodian or trustee
for their account.,,17 While the language of the rule seems
applicable to natural persons only, the rule is also meant to
apply in cases where the issuee is a corporation. IS The substitution of the legend condition will be of economic advantage whether or not transfers take place, but it should be
noted that the normal legend condition allows transfers to
be effected without the consent of the commissioner when the
transfer is made to "the transferor's parents, children, grandchildren, spouse, and custodians or trustees for their account,
or to holders of securities of the same class of the issuer of
this security.
"19 This provision obviates the necessity
for applying for a consent to transfer securities subject to the
legend condition in the instances enumerated,20 and of course
16. The legend condition was originally available only where there was
to be but one issuee (Commissioner of
Corporations Bull. No. 67-7), but its
availability was later expanded to application contemplating the present
maximum of five issuees. The increase
in scope of this simplified condition procedure may be ascribed to the commissioner's general effort to reduce the
burdens on businessmen and the division of corporations in areas where
stringent regulation was felt to be relatively unnecessary. A collateral benefit,
of course, is the freeing of the division's
resources so it might concentrate its
regulatory efforts in areas where the
potential for fraud and abuse are the
greatest. See generally Volk, Fifty
Years of Securities Regulation in California, 42 L.A.B. Bull. 569, 571-72
(1967).
17. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 320.6.
18. See part I(b)(1) of the application
at 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 320.6.
30
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19. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 407.3.
The original legend condition contained
no provision for transfer without consent (Commissioner of Corporations
Bull. Nos. 67-3, 67-4). The permissive provision was likely added for the
reasons set forth above in the discussion of the change in the number of issuees permissible. The addition of such
terms to the legend condition is not
without precedent in the practice of the
division of corporations. A similar
"special family escrow condition" was
previously granted under certain circumstances, which condition allowed
limited transfers of securities subject to
an escrow condition without a formal
order from the commissioner. 2 Ballantine & Sterling, CALIFORNIA CORP.
LAWS, § 450.02 (1967).
20. The first resale of stock subject
to a legend condition by a corporate
issuee would, of course, require the consent of the commissioner in all instances, since that transfer could not be
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eliminates the expense of preparation and the statutory fee
associated with such an application.
The commissioner is giving the legend condition the broadest scope possible. It is applicable not only to new issues;
it may also be substituted in a proper case for an escrow
condition currently imposed upon outstanding securities by
applying for an amendment to the original permit under section 26009. 1 Because the legend condition is expected to
become the norm, the commissioner suggests that applicants
who desire a formal escrow condition in lieu of the legend
condition should so specify that fact in their applications. 2
It should be noted that the application form must contain
the statement by any proposed issuee that "he has not been
solicited to invest in applicant by any person," and must
further contain an amplified statement of the issuee's relationship to the applicant. The proper forms for the application and the issuee's statement are set forth in title 10,
section 320.6 of the California Administrative Code. 3 These
statements will be accorded great weight by the commissioner
in determining whether the transaction is "fair, just and equitable." Statements similar to those now required of proposed
issuees have been required from proposed transferees in the
past and have been utilized in reviewing applications by security holders for a consent to transfer a security subject to an
escrow condition. 4 Where a consent to transfer is necessary,
the requirements of section 419 have been extended to encompass applications for a consent to transfer securities subject to a legend condition. s
one authorized by the terms of the
legend.
1. Commissioner of Corporations
Bull. 67-3, at 1.
2. Commissioner of Corporations
Bull. 67-3, at 2.
3. Unlike some S.E.C. forms, those
associated with the legend condition are
not simply exemplars.
To further
simplify the permit application process
for both the division and the applicant,
the forms found in the administrative
code for the application for permit,
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statement of issuee, and statement of
transferee may be obtained from the
commissioner's office and may be completed merely by filling in the blanks.
See Form, 43 Cal. St. B. J. 106 (1968).
4. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 419.
5. Section 26005 of the Corporations
Code, which stipulated the fee to be
charged for an application for an order
consenting to the transfer of securities
held in escrow, was similarly amended
by adding language so that it will impose the same fee for a consent to a
CAL LAW 1967
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Although the decision whether to impose a legend or escrow
condition is discretionary, the commissioner established guidelines by setting forth situations which, if existent, will result
in the denial of a legend condition and an imposition of an
escrow condition. 6 A legend condition will be denied by the
commissioner if the shares are subject to waiver conditions
applicable to promotional shares or if enumerated persons
closely connected with the issuance of the securities have been
convicted, within the preceding five years, of either a misdemeanor concerning a security, a theft, or any felony, or
have been enjoined from engaging in activities in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. Two additional paragraphs to section 407.2 allow the commissioner to refuse to
grant the legend condition in those situations where he deems
it to be in the public interest to do so, either because he anticipates a statutory violation or for "other good cause."
The legislature added language to existing section 25509
to make administratively less burdensome the commissioner's
duties with respect to securities still held by him in escrow.
The legislature directed that in those cases where the commissioner acts as escrow holder for securities subject to an
escrow condition, he may destroy the certificates in his possession if the corporation that issued the securities is suspended
for a period of not less than two years for nonpayment of
taxes or for other penalties. To protect the security holder,
however, the commissioner is required to keep careful records
of each certificate he destroys under the provisions of this
amended section, and such records "constitute prima facie
evidence as to the matters therein set forth."7
transfer of securities subject to any
condition that requires the commissioner's consent to transfer. The section therefore now includes the legend
condition within its scope.
6. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 407.2.
7. An issuer must issue a replacement security on application by the
owner under the provisions of Commercial Code § 8405, but typically the
32

owner is required to post an indemnity
bond. In order to provide relief from
the onerous, and in this case unnecessary, burden such a bond imposes on
the owner, it would seem feasible to
interpret an indemnity requirement as
unreasonable
under
circumstances
where destruction of the certificate is
verifiable. See Cal. Commercial Code
§ 8405(2) (c).
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In another commissioner's bulletin,S entitled "Alternative
procedure for filing of prospectuses or registration statements: conditional non disapproval for use," the commissioner of corporations initiated a new procedure to assist
proper state blueskying of issues registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and thereby alleviated another
administrative bottleneck. To understand the effect of the
new procedure it would be well to discuss briefly the problem
prevalent prior to the new procedure.
A registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission automatically becomes effective twenty
days after filing unless the commission institutes a stop order
proceeding. 9 The registration statements are typically devoid
of certain price data when originally filed, which data are
usually not included until the day of, or day prior to, the
desired offering date, when a final agreement is reached between the issuer and the underwriters. At that time a "price
amendment" is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission which incorporates data concerning such items as
the offering price and underwriting discounts or commissions
and other selling expenses. The filing of an amendment
ordinarily starts the twenty-day waiting period running anew.
If all other factors are in order, however, the Securities and
Exchange Commission typically accelerates the effective date
of the registration statement, so that the offering can take
place immediately.
Section 25602 of the Corporations Code requires that such
an "advertisement" be filed with the office of the commissioner
at least one day prior to use, and it may then be used absent
notification of disapproval by the commissioner. 1o The prudent corporate lawyer would scarcely proceed with an offering, however, absent some communication indicating nondisapprova1. l l This requirement created communications
problems in the final hours preceding a major security offering.
8. Commissioner of Corporations
Bull. 67-6.
9. Fed. Sec. Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h (1964).
10. Cal. Corp. Code § 25603.
3
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11. See discussion of procedures for
filing of advertising at 2 Ballantine &
Sterling,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAWS, § 453 (1967).
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The commissioner should have sufficient information to be
able to determine whether the offering would work a fraud
on investors or would involve unreasonable profit for underwriters or sellers. Yet his need for a review of the specific
financial terms of the underwriting is minimal. The commission has now alleviated the issuer's problem by offering
to grant a conditional nondisapproval of a prospectus or registration statement, provided that certain information is furnished and conditions are met. 12
The first condition is that the public offering price of the
security must be committed to be between specified maximum
and minimum amounts, and the price range may not exceed
the applicable maximum range acceptable to the commissioner. Next, underwriting discounts or commissions must be
committed to be not in excess of specified maximum amounts
or percentages. Third, redemption prices or conversion prices
must either be specifically set forth or else must be committed
to be between specified maximum and minimum amounts.
Further, if the dividend rate or amount of interest payable
has not been definitely set forth, the rate or amount must be
committed to be within ten percent of a specified maximum.
Finally, if any other selling expense has not been definitely set
forth, the application must state an amount that such expenses
will not exceed.
If the conditional nondisapproval is granted, the issuer
need only file a copy of the final prospectus or registration
statement within two business days after the effective date
to comply with section 25602. 13 The information contained in the commitments of the application is sufficient to
enable the commissioner to determine whether the terms of
the offering might be unfair and a subsequent prompt verification that the terms in fact complied with the commitment
12. This new procedure is intended
to have no effect on the use of prepermit prospectus ("red herrings") by
brokers. See title 10 Cal. Admin. Code,
§ 687. See generally 1 Loss, SEcURmES
REGULATIONS, 187-93, 203-04 (2d ed.
1961).
13. The commissioner's nondisap34
CAL LAW 1967
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proval, then, is conditioned upon only
two factors. They are (1) the final
effectiveness of the registration statement having terms within the commitments as set forth in the application,
and (2) the subsequent filing within two
business days of a copy of the final
prospectus or registration.
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is sufficient to protect the public interest. 14 In order that a
corporation required to obtain a permit in California, in
addition to approval of its advertising, is not placed in a disadvantageous position for a national issue, the same procedures may be used to obtain a permit, which would have the
permissible underwriting terms stated in ranges, rather than
fixed prices. 15 The form on which an application for such a
conditional nondisapproval is to be submitted was promulgated as part of the bulletin.
The commissioner has also used his discretionary authority
in another fashion to mitigate the administrative burden which
Corporations Code section 25602 places both on licensed
security brokers and on the division of corporations. Again
he implemented a new rule that retains protection for the
public in situations where it needs protection and yet allows
a streamlined administrative procedure where other regulatory procedures and the internal business of reputable brokers
will provide a sufficient protection. Hence, advertising need
not be filed by a licensed security broker when it (1) does
not contain false or misleading information; (2) is not communicated by means of public media; (3) does not concern a
security subject to an escrow or legend condition; (4) concerns a security that is being offered by the broker as an agent
only; (5) is approved by a responsible officer of the broker;
and (6) is retained by the broker for a period of three years
subject to the review of the commissioner. 16 An exemption
for licensed security brokers from the conditions of section
25602 is further provided to eliminate the necessity for filing
tombstone advertising, 17 or "such other advertising as is
14. See Loss and Cowett, BLUE SKY
at 123 (1958).
15. A similar provision allowing simultaneous effectiveness is found in the
Uniform Securities Act, § 303(C). That
provision deals with registrations and
requires notification "by telephone or
telegram of the date and time when the
federal registration statement became
effective and the content of the price
amendment, . . ." in addition to a
follow-up filing of the terms of the price
LAW

amendment. Statutory provisions based
on this section, which would allow a
similar "qualification by coordination"
when the S.E.C. registration statement
became effective, have been proposed to
the legislature. Assembly Bill 1, 1968
Reg. Sess. Cal. Legis. §§ 25111, 25300
(1968).
16. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 641.
17. See 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 226-32 (2d ed. 1961).
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defined" by Securities and Exchange Commission rule 134/8
which relates to securities for which a permit is already in
effect or for which a nondisapproval prospectus is on file. I9
Such advertisements are only for the alleged purpose of "identifying the existence of a public offering and the availability
of a prospectus and they are not to be selling literature of any
kind."20
Such formal changes in commission practices are of much
assistance to the practicing corporate bar, but also of considerable value are informal guidelines from the commissioner
that aid corporate lawyers in interpreting the Corporate
Securities Law and in being aware of commission attitudes.
The corporate lawyer is often faced with a difficult decision,
for instance, in trying to resolve whether a permit need be
obtained for the issuance of a security when a question arises
about whether his client's proposed offering is public or private. I To assist in this analysis, the commissioner of corporations has published a guideline for determining when securities
are public in nature. 2 Although the commissioner cautioned
that "the factors listed are not intended necessarily to be exclusive, and that the weight to be given to each of the factors
will vary from case to case and that the final conclusion is
thus determined not by an arithmetical procedure, but by
value judgment," he did list, roughly rank, and discuss six
factors he deemed significant in making such a determination.
The first two factors, "the number of offerees" and "the
relationship of the offerees to each other," both essentially
deal with the same factor, that is, the number of individual
components in the group to which an offer is to be made. The
second factor is related to the first, insofar as a close relationship between the offerees may indicate an exchange of information and appraisal among them so as to reduce
effectively the number of individual investor units that are
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134.
19. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 641(b).
20. Uniform Securities Act ReI. 3535
(1955).

for either particular issues or issuers if
the security is not offered to the public.
Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25100(1), (m); 25102
(c), (d).

1. Several provisions of the Corporate Securities Law provide exemptions
36
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involved as potential purchasers. The third factor is the
character of "the relationship between the issuer and the
offerees." Here, a finding of personal confidence of all, or
most, of the offerees in the issuer would be a factor tending to
indicate a private offering.
The fourth factor is the "size of the offering" and relates
to whether the offering, measured both by the dollar amount
of the individual security units and the number of units into which the issue is divided, is of a character that would be
purchased by the general public. Where the individual security, for instance, is issued in one million dollar amounts, it
is clearly foreclosed as an investment opportunity for the
public, and it can be expected that only a relatively few
offerees would be interested in such a security or would be
solicited. Similarly, if a large enough number of units is
involved so as to permit redistribution to the public, that
factor may indicate a public offering even though no such
initial distribution is contemplated.
The fifth factor, "the manner of the offering," was cited by
the commissioner as "perhaps the most significant single
factor" that is applicable to this determination. Significant
here is whether the issuer or purchaser carries the investment
initiative and how vigorously it is carried. The media used
to convey the offer is also important, for it is indicative of
the group intended to be reached. For example, an offering
conducted by the use of radio, television, or mass mailings
would most assuredly be categorized as public in nature.
The sixth and final factor deals with "the character of the
security offered." As in the fourth factor, this factor primarily relates to the attractiveness of the security to the
general investing public. Certain business enterprises, such
as those in the electronics industry and certain real estate
developments, attract widespread public interest, whereas
securities containing unusual or uncommercial arrangements
can be expected to attract only a relatively limited group of
investors and only that group can be expected to be solicited.
The commissioner further stated that he would issue an opinCAL LAW 1967
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ion in those cases where he can clearly decide whether an
offering is public in nature. s
The commissioner issued a second guideline pertaining to
the applicability of the Corporate Securities Law to the franchise, a form of business gaining increasing currency. The
guideline4 is based on an opinion solicited from the Attorney
General by the commissioner. The Attorney General's opinion5 presented a new position on the question of whether
franchise arrangements constitute securities within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law. 6 The corporations commissioner requested the Attorney General's opinion on three
variations that franchise arrangements might commonly take:
1. Where the franchisee participates only nominally
in the franchised business in exchange for a share of
the profits.
2. Where the franchisee participates actively in the
franchised business and where the franchisor agrees to
provide certain goods and services to the franchisee.
3. Where the franchisee participates actively in the
franchised business and where the franchisor agrees to
provide certain goods and services to the franchisee,
but where the franchisor intends to secure a substantial
portion of the initial capital that is needed to provide
such goods and services from the fees paid by the franchisee or franchisees. 7
As to the first situation, the Attorney General stated that
the investor primarily purchased the right to share in proceeds
3. Such an opinion, and the bulletins
themselves, are of a limited value (see
Bank of Alameda County v. McColgan,
69 Cal. App.2d 464, 159 P.2d 31
[1945]), as compared to formal rules
issued under the Administrative Procedures Act, which have the force of
law. The proposed securities law would
protect persons who rely on such communiques from liability from acts done
in good-faith conformity therewith. Assembly Bill 1, 1968 Reg. Sess. Calif.
Legis. § 25700 (1968). Compare Fed.
Sec. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w.
38
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4. Commissioner of Corporations
Bull. 67-8.
5. 49 Op. Att'y. Gen. 124 (June 2,
1967). For a more extensive development of franchising under the California Corporate Securities Law, see
Note, Franchise Regulations under the
California Corporate Securities Law, 5
San Diego L. Rev. 140 (1968).
6. Compare 12 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen.
23 (1948).

7. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 124-25
(1967).
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of the franchised business and that the business form "differs
in name only from the 'limited partnership' agreements that
were held to be securities in People v. Hoshor."8 He further
stated that the same result would obtain even if the contract
permitted the franchisee to elect either an active or only
nominal role in the actual management of the business. If
such an option appears in the contract, the Attorney General
would view it as an offer to sell a security and therefore as
being within the scope of the Corporate Securities Law. 9
As to the second situation, it was clear to the Attorney
General that no security would be involved because "the
profit will be attributable to the franchisee's own efforts" and
hence the situation would fall within the category of agreements to which the Corporate Securities Law is not applicable. 10
The third situation has a common element with the second
situation insofar as the profits derived by the franchisee would
again be due to his own effort. The Attorney General said,
however, that the furnishing of initial capital to the franchisor
"seems to us to be a separate business risk apart from the
success or failure of the franchisee's conduct of the franchised
business. . . .'>11 Such a business risk was felt to be within
the scope of the Corporate Securities Law because, citing
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski/ 2 "its objective is to
afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of
realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or
not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another.m3

~

8. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. at 126.
For arguments on behalf of not holding
such a contractual arrangement to be a
security see Coleman, A Franchise
Agreement; Not a "Security" under
the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. Law
493 (1967).
For People v. Hoshor see 92 Cal.
App.2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949).
9. See Securities & Exchange Comm.
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 90
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L.ed. 1244, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 163 A.L.R.
1043 (1946).

10. See People v. Syde, 37 Cal.2d at
768, 235 P.2d at 602-03 (1951).
11. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 124, 129
(1967).
12. 55 Cal.2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr.
at 188, 361 P.2d at 908, 87 A.L.R.2d
at 1139 (1961).
13. 49 Op. Att'y. Gen. at 128 (1967).
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The commissioner adopted these OpInIOnS In Bulletin
67-8, where they were summarized as follows:
[AJ franchise constitutes a security subject to the
permit requirement of the Corporate Securities Law
where either the franchisee is to take a passive role in the
franchised business, or a substantial portion of the initial
risk capital of the franchisor is to be contributed by the
franchisee.
The difficult question here, of course, is what constitutes
the providing of initial capital so as to create an investment
risk as distinguished from a payment to an established franchisor for the granting of the franchise and the providing of
goods and services. The Attorney General ventured that
he could provide no definite guidelines to resolve this question
and that each case would have to be examined on its merits.14
The commissioner, however, listed some factors helpful in
resolving the question. The factors all relate to how well
established the franchisor is-whether he already has sufficient capital when the franchisee arrives on the scene, whether
he has a history of successful operation, and whether he already has an organization adequate to meet his commitments
to the franchisee. The commissioner thus eliminated some
of the guesswork regarding the scope of the Corporate
Securities Law.
Unincorporated Associations
The legislature made several changes to the Corporations
Code and the Code of Civil Procedure that pertain to partnerships and other unincorporated associations. A new pare5
was added to the Corporations Code which defines the legal
characteristics of, and filing provisions for, unincorporated
associations. The provisions apply to all "unincorporated
organizations of two or more persons, whether organized for
profit or not," except governmental agencies. Governmental
14. 49 op. Att'y. Gen. at 129 (1967).

40

15. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 24000-24006,
to Title 3.
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agencies may be "persons," however, and therefore component parts of unincorporated associations. 16
Corporations Code section 24001 gives an unincorporated
association an entity status with respect to liability to nonmembers for "an act or omission of the association, and
of its officer, agent or employee acting within the
scope of his . . . agency . . . ."17 Such entity liability
arguably already existed in California in torts,18 but probably
did not exist as to contractual obligations,19 absent express
statutory provisions to the contrary.20 The provision, however, specifically leaves undisturbed the law that determines
liability between an association and its members. Section
24002 provides that "only the property of the unincorporated
association may be levied upon under a writ of execution
issued to enforce a judgment against the association," a result previously accomplished by Code of Civil Procedure
section 388.
Under the provisions of new section 24003 (a) (1) (2),
an unincorporated association having a regular place of business within California may, at its discretion, file a form designating the location of its principal office in the state and may
further designate either a natural person or corporation as
agent for service of process. If the association has no office
in the state, it may designate an address for receipt of notices. 1
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 24003 proceed to
spell out in detail the requirements for the filing of a designation of an agent or of a principal location within the state
and the effect of the filing of an amending statement by unincorporated associations. If an agent is designated in accord16. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 24000(a), (b).
17. This provision settles any question of whether the provision allowing
suit against an association under its
common name (Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 388) was merely procedural and hence
whether any entity liability existed. See
Comment, Liability of Members and
Officers of Nonprofit Unincorporated
Assoc. for Contracts and Torts, 42
Calif. L. Rev. 812, 814-18 (1954).

18. See Inglis v. Operating Engineers
Local Union No. 12, 58 Cal.2d 269,
23 Cal. Rptr. 403, 373 P.2d 467 (1962).
19. See Pacific Freight Lines v. Valley Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Cal. App.2d
505, 164 P.2d 901 (1946); Security-First
Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 62 Cal. App.2d
at 666, 145 P.2d at 729 (1944).
20. See, for example, Cal. Corp. Code
§ 21200.
1. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(a)(I)(2).
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ance with the provisions of section 24003, delivery of process by hand to such agent constitutes valid service on the
association. 2
This provision replaces the procedure of serving one or
more of the association's members as the primary technique
for service of process on associations. Service to members
may still be made if no agent is designated or if the designated
agent cannot be found at the address specified in the index
described below. 3
Corporations Code section 24004 provides for the creation
and maintenance of an index of statements filed under the
provisions of section 24003. A filed statement expires "five
years from December 31 following the date it was filed."4
The Secretary of State is authorized to destroy any such statement four years after the expiration date (or between nine
and ten years after the original filing of the statement),5
and may also delete any reference to the statement from the
index at that time. 6 This provision will alleviate the problem
of retention of outdated and inaccurate records. Deletion
of such information from the Secretary of State's index may
have adverse effects on a foreign partnership subject to the
provisions of section 15700, discussed below, because service
of process may thereafter be made on the Secretary of State
and actual notice may never occur. Provision is made, however, for notification by the Secretary of State to any unincorporated association that has filed a statement under the
provisions of section 24003 when the statement has expired
because of lapse of time7 or because of a resignation of the
designated agent. s Nevertheless, failure of the Secretary of
State to accomplish such notification will provide no protection for an unincorporated association whose statement is
no longer effective. 9
Foreign partnerships not having a regular place of business in California will be similarly treated. They will be
2. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(e); Cal.
Code Civ. Pro. § 411(2.1).
3. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 411 (2.1).
4. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(d).
5. Cal. Corp. Code § 24004(a).
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required, under the amended provisions of section 15700, to
file a designation of agent as provided in new section 24003,
discussed above. The amendment to section 15700 also
allows a foreign partnership to designate, in accordance with
section 24003, a corporation, instead of a natural person as
was previously required, as agent for the partnership upon
whom process may be served in the State of California. 1o The
designations will be indexed as provided in new section 24004.
If the designation has not been made or if service cannot be
made on the agent designated in the index, the amended
section provides for personal service on the Secretary of State,
as under the previous law. Such personal service, however,
must now be accompanied by "a written statement signed by
the party to the action seeking such service, or by his attorney
setting forth the last-known address of the partnership.
"11

Other additions and amendments made in order to clarify
the legal status of, and procedures applicable to, an unincorporated association are found in sections 388, 395.2, 410
and 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 388 of the
Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that any unincorporated association "may sue and be sued in the name which
it has assumed or by which it is known.,,12 Under the previous law, partnerships and other unincorporated associations
could be sued, but could not sue,13 in their assumed names.
New section 395.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes
the proper venue of an action against an unincorporated association identical to that of a corporation if the association
has filed a statement listing the location of its principal office
pursuant to section 24003. Under article XII, section 16
of the California Constitution, the proper venue for the two
business forms was already identical except that the pro10. This amendment gives foreign
partnerships the same privilege of utilizing a corporation as its agent for service
of process that domestic and foreign
corporations doing business in California have long enjoyed under the provisions of Cal. Corp. Code §§ 3301 and
6403, respectively.
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11. Cal. Corp. Code § 15700.
12. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 388(a).
13. Case v. Kadota Fig Assn., 35 Cal.
2d at 602, 220 P.2d at 916 (1950);
Grand Grove of U.A.O.D. v. Garibaldi
Grove No. 71, 130 Cal. at 119, 62 P. at
487 (1900).
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vision for suit "in the county where the principal place of
business . . . is situated" was thought to be inapplicable
to associations. 14
Section 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals
with the proper method of service and return of summons,
has been amended by replacing the phrase "against associates
conducting business under a common name" with the newly
defined term "unincorporated association" without working
any substantive change. Amendments to section 411 set
forth the proper persons to whom service of process must be
made in a suit against an unincorporated association. I6 In
the case of an unincorporated association other than a foreign
partnership, service shall be made on an agent designated
by the unincorporated association in accordance with the
provisions of section 24003 of the Corporations Code. If
it has chosen not to designate such an agent, or if the agent
cannot be found at the address specified in the index, then
service must be made "to anyone or more of the association's
members and by mailing the copy thereof to the association at
its last known mailing address. "16
California's Uniform Limited Partnership Act was changed
to allow the amendment of a partnership certificate in the
case where a partnership has twenty-five or more limited
members by a procedure simpler administratively than that
previously required.
New Corporations Code section
15525.5 promulgates the new procedure. 17 Previously, any
amendment to a certificate of partnership was required to
"be signed and acknowledged by all members.,,18 Partnerships with more than twenty-five limited partners, however,
may now effect amendments over the signature of a general
partner alone, if the partnership certificate so permits.
Section 15525.5 contains an exceptional provision for those
cases in which an amendment substitutes or adds a partner;
14. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Union, 37 Cal.2d at
762, 235 P.2d at 608 (1951).
15. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 411(2.1),
411(2.2).
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16. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 411(2.1).
17. Cal. Corp. Code § 15508 was also
amended to reflect the availability of
the new technique.
18, Cal. Corp. Code § 15525(b).
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it requires signatures of the persons joining and leaving the
partnership as limited partners.
The judiciary was relatively inactive in the law of unincorporated associations during the past year. The Court of
Appeal for the Second District, however, held directly for the
first time that a partnership has no right to recover damages
inflicted on a member of the partnership by a third party.
In Sharfman v. State of California/ 9 the individual plaintiff
Sharfman was injured as a result of the negligence of the
State of California. In addition to recovery being sought
through plaintiff's individual causes of action, the partnership
in which Sharfman was engaged as a landscape architect
sought recovery for loss of profits. The partnership relied
in part on the case of Darmour Productions Corp. v. H. M.
Baruch Corp.,20 which had held that a corporation may recover damages for a negligent injury to its employee. The
court pointed out that the recovery in Darmour was based
on a limited common-law principle that had been codified in
section 49 of the Civil Code, which forbids "any injury to a
servant which affects his ability to serve his master. . . ."
The common-law liability of one who negligently injures a
servant to the master of that servant is one of a limited number of relations that creates a right to recovery by a third
person who might benefit from the services denied him by
the injury suffered by another. Two similar principles, that
a husband may recover for loss of services of his wife and
that a parent may recover for loss of services of his child,
continue to remain well recognized. The expansion of such
principles to partnerships would have been an anachronism,
however, since the principle on which it would be based,
The probable
liability to a master, itself is under attack. 1
basis for the dissatisfaction with the latter rule is the premise
that the probability of a negligent person causing such harm
is remote and unforeseeable. 2 Although the familial re19. 253 Cal. App.2d - , 61 Cal. Rptr.
266 (1967).
20. 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.2d 664
(1933).
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1. See Seavey, Negligent Harln to
Servant, Wash. U.L.Q. 309 (1956).
2. See Columbia Taxicab Co. v.
Mercurio, 236 S.W. 1096 (C.A. Mo.
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lationships are to be anticipated, and recovery continues to
be allowed for injuries in that area, damage to third parties
resulting from a victim's partnership relationship is not reasonably foreseeable and hence falls within the general rule
that negligent interference with the performance of a contractual relationship between the injured party and a third
party is not actionable.3
1921); Prosser,
1964).
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964 (3d ed.

3. See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54
Ca1.2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d
1073, 78 A.L.R.2d 813 (1960).
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